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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
willful absence of the wife. The wife countered with the contention that
the husband was not entitled to sue because he was guilty of unclean
hands in that he had left the home first. The evidence showed that the
husband had left the home for a few days in order to allow the wife to
collect her thoughts regarding their marital difficulties and that he in-
tended to return. The court held that the husband was not guilty of un-
clean hands.
EDGAt I. KING
EVIDENCE
During the year 1958, there was a sizeable number of Ohio cases
which involved important rules of evidence, but most of them dealt with
questions about which there is little controversy. A few cases, however,
merit comment.
Scientific Evidence: Radar
In City of East Cleveland v. Ferrell,' defendant was convicted of oper-
ating a motor vehicle at a speed of forty-two miles an hour in a con-
gested district in violation of an ordinance of the city. He offered no
evidence in his behalf. The sole question presented to the Supreme Court
was: May a defendant be convicted of speeding solely upon evidence ob-
tained from a radar speed meter, in the absence of expert testimony with
respect to the construction of the meter and its method of operation? The
Court answered: Yes.
Although the question was one of first impression in Ohio, there is
no lack of authority in other jurisdictions.2 At first the courts refused to
admit radar readings into evidence unless accompanied by expert testi-
mony. Later cases, however, hold that the accuracy of radar is well-
proven and may no longer be questioned; that the courts, therefore, are
fully justified in taking judicial notice thereof. One court has said: 3
1. 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958).
2. In an article, Langschmidr, Radar Traffic Controls 23 TENN. L. Rnv. 784
(1955), it was said that radar speed meters were being used in forty-three states,
the District of Columbia, and Hawaii. See also Carosell & Cooambs, Radar Evidence
in the Courts 32 DICTA 323 (1955); Symposium: Kopper, Radar Speedmeters,
33 N.C.L REV. 343 (1955); Woodbridge, Radar in the Courts, 40 VA. L. Rgv. 809
(1954); Schmidt, Radar and Marine Collisions Today, 10 HASTINGS L J. 71
(1958).
3. People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728 (1958).
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We think the time has come when we may recognize the general re-
liability of the radar speedmeter as a device for measuring the speed of a
moving vehicle, and that it will no longer be necessary to require expert
testimony in each case as to the nature, function or scientific principles
underlying it."
In the Ohio case, undisputed evidence was offered by the city show-
ing that the radar device had been adequately checked, calibrated, and
tested on the morning of the violation, and that it was found to be work-
ing properly in all respects. There was also evidence to the effect that
the officer in charge of the radar car had had five years of experience in
the use of radar and was, therefore, eminently qualified to read the dial
on the meter.
Witness Impeached by Prior Statement: Rehabilitation
In Shellock v. Klenrpay Brothers,5 the court reaffirmed a long estab-
lished rule in Ohio but pointed out that it should not be considered as
a blanket rule or one which is absolute. Ordinarily, where, upon the
trial of a case, a witness is shown to have made statements of fact con-
tradictory to those made by him on the trial, it is error to permit an at-
tempt to rehabilitate the impeached witness by proving that he had made
prior statements similar to those made on the trial.6 In the instant case,
however, the court held that where, on cross-examination, a witness is im-
peached by a showing of prior statements made by him in a written in-
strument and apparently inconsistent with his statements on direct exami-
nation, reference to other statements in the same document used to im-
peach him is proper for the purpose of rehabilitation, where such other
statements are consistent with those made on direct examination or are
in explanation of such apparent inconsistency and do not serve to inject
new issues into the case.
The Physician-Patient Privilege: Waiver by Patient
In re Roberto7 involved the highly controversial privilege accorded
the physician-patient relationship. This was an original proceeding by a
physician to release him from technical arrest on a mittimus issued for
4. See also State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 100 A.2d 778 (1953); Peterson v. State,
163 Neb. 669, 80 N.W.2d 688 (1957); Dietze v. State, 162 Neb. 80, 75 N.W.2d
95 (1956); State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35, (1955); Dooley v. Com-
monwealth, 198 Va. 32, 92 S.E.2d 348 (1956); State v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 304,
292 P.2d 399 (1956).
5. 167 Ohio St. 279, 148 N.E.2d 57 (1958).
6. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Stephens, 75 Ohio St. 171, 79 N.E. 235 (1906).
7. 151 N.E.2d 37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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contempt of a notary public because of his refusal to answer certain ques-
tions propounded to him during the course of a hearing by way of depo-
sition in two cases involving personal injuries alleged to have been sus-
tained by the physician's patient. His refusal to answer was based en-
tirely upon his claim of privilege due to the physician-patient relation-
ship.8 It appears that prior to the taking of the physician's deposition,
the patient herself, for the purpose of perpetuating her testimony by way
of deposition, voluntarily testified in great detail as to her injuries, symp-
toms, and complaints and to the physician's examination and treatment of
her. Upon the taking of his deposition, the physician, although testifying
concerning communications made to him by his patient, refused to state
his findings and to relate his diagnosis. He took the position that he
could not testify to anything more than what his patient had testified to
in her deposition.
The primary question, therefore, was whether or not the patient, by
testifying in great detail as to her injuries, her general condition, and to
communications between herself and her physician, waived the benefits
of the statutory privilege. In an able and well-considered opinion by
Judge Hurd, the court held that if a patient, as part of her case, volun-
tarily testifies to what was said or done by her physician in the examina-
tion and treatment of her injury, she waives the privilege and exempts
the evidence of the physician relative to such matters from the operation
of the statute. The writ of habeas corpus, therefore, was denied.
It is both logical and just that when the patient voluntarily makes
public the intimate details of his affliction, or gives his version of what
the physician said or did, he should not be permitted to insist that the
protection and benefits of the statute continue to exist as to his physician.
When a patient chooses to make public that which could have been kept
secret, the privilege no longer exists and the physician may testify fully
on the same subject.9 The Ohio statute plainly so states.10 The adverse
party may also introduce in evidence portions of the patient's hospital
record not otherwise inadmissible."
8. As to right of physician himself to interpose objection, see DEWIr, PRI-
LEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT, 5§ 16, 89 (1958).
9. Lane v. Boicourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E. 1111 (1891); Hethier v. Johns, 233
N.Y. 370, 135 N.E. 603 (1922); Capron v. Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11, 85 N.E. 827
(1908). For a general discussion of the subject, see DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COM-
MUNICATIONS BETwEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT, §§ 133, 134, 135 (1958).
10. OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02.
11. Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Maas
v. Midway Chevrolet Co., 219 Minn. 461, 18 N.W.2d 233, (1945); Galli v. Wells,
209 Mo. App. 460, 239 S.W. 894 (1922); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72
N.E.2d 245 (1947).
